This article presents and studies models for multi-criteria budget allocation problems under uncertainty. The proposed models incorporate uncertainties in decision maker's weights using a robust weighted sum approach. The risk averseness of the decision maker in satisfying random risk-related constraints is ensured by using stochastic dominance. A sample average approximation approach together with a cutting surface method is used to solve this model. An analysis for the computation of statistical lower and upper bounds is also given. The proposed models are used to study the budget allocation to ten urban areas in the United States under the Urban Areas Security Initiative. Here the decision maker considers property losses, fatalities, air departures, and average daily bridge traffic as separate criteria. The properties of the proposed modeling and solution methodology are discussed using a RAND Corporation-proposed allocation policy and the current government budget allocation as two benchmarks. The budget results are discussed under several parameter scenarios.
Introduction
Budget allocation problems arise frequently in the real world. Examples include finance, education, construction, transportation, ecology, telecommunication, etc. (see Paxson and Schady (2002) ; Karlaftis et al. (2007) ; Phillips and Bana e Costa (2007) ; Lin et al. (2009) ; Chauvenet et al. (2010) ). Phillips and Bana e Costa (2007) describe five characteristics of the decision dilemma in such problems: (i) benefits are typically expressed by multiple objectives often in conflict; (ii) decision makers cannot know every detail about a large number of given alternatives to make informed decisions; (iii) individually optimal decisions rarely lead to the collectively best use of the available resources; (iv) involved stakeholders cause dispute and competition; and (v) those who disagree with the decisions overemphasize their own opinions in implementation. Uncertainty resulting from incomplete information is a major reason for misallocation of resources (see Dougherty and Psacharopoulos (1977) and Al-Najjar et al. (2008) ). An important example is the cost overrun risk in project management (see Lerche and Paleologos (2001) ; Flyvb- * Corresponding author jerg et al. (2003) ; Tseng et al. (2005) ; Miller et al. (2010) ). The Association for Project Management for the United Kingdom (Hougham, 2000, p. 27) defines the cost overrun as "the amount by which a contractor exceeds or expects to exceed the estimated costs and/or the final limitations (the ceiling) of a contract." Phillips and Bana e Costa (2007) highlight the need for multi-criteria approaches that enable decision makers to trade off the costs, risks, and multiple benefits and to construct good investment portfolios across different areas to make the best use of limited resources. Typical methods applied to capital budgeting include the goal programming approach, the weighted sum approach, the multi-criteria decision, analysis, and the analytic hierarchy process (see Steuer and Na (2003) for a survey).
In this article we consider a class of budget allocation problems where the goal is to allocate funds to multiple sites according to multiple decision criteria. In its simplest form, if there is only one decision criterion with a deterministic performance indicator for each site and a fixed overall budget, the problem is simple-the budget allocated to a site is proportional to its performance indicator. In the general case, though, there may be multiple evaluation criteria. In this situation, typically there is discrepancy (uncertainty) among multiple experts in giving relative weights to each 0740-817X C 2011 "IIE" evaluation criterion (see for a detailed discussion). Moreover, for each criterion, the indicators measuring a site performance may be subject to uncertainty. In this situation, there is an additional uncertainty of specifying decision makers' risk aversion when making stochastic comparisons. Thus, we have a multiobjective problem involving three types of uncertainties: (i) uncertainty in weights that would balance multiple decision criteria; (ii) uncertainty in the performance indicators; and (iii) uncertainty in decision maker's risk aversion.
Stochastic dominance (see, for example, Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994) ; Müller and Stoyan (2002) ; Levy (2006) ; Sriboonchita et al. (2009) ) provides a way to incorporate risk aversion by imposing constraints that ensure that any risk-averse decision maker will prefer the outcome of the model depending on the solution to a benchmark. Optimization problems with stochastic dominance constraints are introduced in Ruszczyński (2003, 2004) . Recently, univariate stochastic dominance in the optimization models have been used to model finance, energy, and transportation problems (see, for example, Dentcheva and Ruszczyński (2006) ; Karoui and Meziou (2006) ; Roman et al. (2006) ; Gollmer et al. (2007) ; Luedtke (2008) ; Nie et al. (2009) ). The notions of multivariate positive linear second-order stochastic dominance is studied in Dentcheva and Ruszczyński (2009) . The concept of multivariate positive linear second-order stochastic dominance is extended to that of a multivariate polyhedral second-order stochastic dominance (P-dominance) in Homem-de-Mello and Mehrotra (2009) . Homem-deMello and Mehrotra (2009) also develop a cutting surface method for solving the corresponding optimization problems. A sample average approximation technique for solving such problems having continuously distributed random parameters is developed in .
The budget models presented in this article use a multicriteria robust weighted sum technique (McRow; see ) together with the concept of Pdominance to address the three types of uncertainties previously described. More specifically, the models have the following features: (i) a robust weighted sum objective that allows the decision makers to suggest a set of trade-off weights of criteria and then optimizes the worst case over the set; and (ii) risk-averse constraints using the concept of P-dominance into the robust model to address uncertainty in describing a decision maker's utility function (degree of risk aversion). We study the characteristics of these modeling features in an application of a budget allocation problem in homeland security.
The problem of budgeting for homeland security is a decision problem with multiple objectives. For instance, Haimes (2004) lists four objectives for these problems, involving protection of (i) critical cyber-physical infrastructures; (ii) economic structures; (iii) organizational-societal infrastructure and the continuity of the government operations; as well as (iv) human lives and individual property, liberty, and freedom. The decision maker is faced with the dilemma of balancing monetary expenditure (losses) for threat prevention with potential threat to loss of human life and social values. The models presented in the literature often measure consequences of the disasters in monetary terms. However, it is difficult to convert human losses into monetary terms precisely, and these estimates may vary widely depending on the perspective one takes. A further complicating fact is that the assessment of each of these criteria separately may be inaccurate, which leads to a risk of budget misallocation due to parameter uncertainty. Hence, we have a situation where the budgeting decision is to be made for multiple objectives where each of the objectives is stochastic, which fits the framework of our previously described.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose prototypes of our models. In Section 3, we present an approach for solving these models using the Sample Average Approximation (SAA) technique. Section 4 applies the models to a budget allocation problem in homeland security. We study these models for the budget allocation to ten main urban areas in the United States under the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). The models are studied with a RAND Corporation-proposed allocation policy as a benchmark and the average government budget allocation (over 5 years) as a benchmark. In Section 5, we numerically analyze the performance of the algorithms and methods by which we solve these models. Section 6 discusses various cases with different parameter settings in these models and studies the characteristics of these models. The results suggest that the government current budget allocation are consistent with those suggested by our models. Appendix A provides proofs for several results stated in the text and Appendix B further analyzes the sensitivity of important parameters in these models.
Definitions and models

The budget allocation problem
We introduce some notation for the class of budget allocation problems we consider. Let n denote the number of sites among which we need to allocate the budget, and let m denote the number of criteria used to evaluate the performance of each site. The performance indicator of site j with respect to criterion i is given by a random quantity A i j , which is subject to uncertainty. Thus, we have an (m × n) random matrix A such that the A i j are (possibly dependent) non-negative random variables defined on a common probability space ( , F, P) with the property that j A i j = 1 a.s. for all i .
We denote the percentage of the budget allocated to site j by x j , which is a decision variable. More generally, the decision vector is represented by x ∈ X ⊆ R n . Given a particular allocation x, the budget misallocation with respect to criterion i is measured by a function M i (x, A). Examples of such functions are the absolute deviation n j =1 |A i j − x j |, the semi-deviation n j =1 (A i j − x j ) + (where (·) + := max{·, 0}), etc. Other non-linear examples are also possible. We will restrict our selection to the semi-deviation metric because of the limitation of the current optimization solver technology available. The function M i (x,A) may also be viewed as a regret (penalty) function. If the budget allocated to site j is in proportion to or greater than the performance indicator A i j , then there is no regret. Otherwise, the regret increases linearly with amount of shortfall in proportional allocation with respect to this performance indicator value. The semi-deviation metric is also called the cost overrun risk in project management (see, for example, Tseng et al. (2005) for discussions on the cost overrun). Note that the quantity M i (x,A) is random, since A is random. We assume that M i (x,A) is integrable, so the multiple decision criteria are given by a random vector
is the space of integrable mappings from the underlying probability space to R m ). For simplicity, we also assume that we want to minimize the misallocation corresponding to each of the decision criteria. Thus, it is important to define appropriate ways to formulate this stochastic optimization problem, which we do next.
Multi-objective robust models with dominance
Stochastic dominance
Before we describe the model, we review notions of stochastic dominance, which is used to compare risk in our model. A random variable X ∈ L 1 stochastically dominates another random variable Y ∈ L 1 in the concave second order, written [u(Y) ] for all increasing convex u. It is easy to show that X (icx) Y if and only if −X (icv) −Y. In other words, X (icx) Y if any risk-averse decision maker prefers the outcomes given by X to the outcomes given by Y.
We use the concept of P-dominance as follows. A random vector X ∈ L m 1 is preferable to another random vector Y ∈ L m 1 with respect to a given non-empty polyhedral set
No generality is lost if we assume w 1 = 1. We will also assume that w ≥ 0 since the components of w represent the importance of each criterion. In our computational study we assume that P represents the convex hull of a collection of weights. In our context, the assumption that P is given by a finite number of extreme points is reasonable as specific weights may correspond to opinion weights of different decision makers. It is possible to consider other convex sets, such as an ellipsoid (see and ); however, it adds to the complexity of the model.
A robust optimization model with stochastic dominance constraints
. . , a, be the weights suggested by the decision makers, and P be the convex hull of
. . , q be the given benchmarks. The robust risk adjusted budget allocation model (Model I) is given as follows:
The objective function in Model I provides a way to handle multi-objective problems with uncertainty. While this objective ensures that the optimal solution given by the model is better than the benchmark in terms of the expectation (assuming the benchmark is a feasible solution) of the weighted sum of misallocation values, it is possible that the proposed solution is riskier than an available benchmark. Decision makers often have implicit or explicit benchmarks that they would like to compare against the solutions given by a model. Using P-dominance, constraints (2b) ensure the prerequisite that a feasible solution be less risky than the provided benchmarks. Nevertheless, Model I without dominance constraints (2b) is a valid optimization model for budget allocation that may have independent value. We represent this model as (Model I ):
The increasing convex dominance requirement in Equation (2b) is consistent with the situation where the degree of risk aversion of decision makers is unknown. The model ensures that the expected negative impact (utility) of the budget misallocation proposed by our model is less than that of the benchmarks for all increasing convex functions. The requirement of P-dominance above is weaker than
for all increasing convex functions u : R m → R, which is thought to be very conservative in practice (see Zaras and Martel (1994) and Nowak (2004) ). In fact, the homeland security case study model in Sections 4-6 becomes infeasible if the notion of positive linear second-order dominance is used. Note that the positive linear second-order dominance is a relaxation of the general second-order dominance just described. Hence, the homeland security case study also has no feasible solution when constrained by general second-order dominance. Alternative approaches to defining vector dominance are also given in Zaras and Martel (1994) and Nowak (2004) under an additive and probability independence condition. Under a component-wise probability independence assumption, Huang et al. (1978) show that the multivariate dominance reduces to the univariate dominance between corresponding components. If additive independence condition holds, Keeney and Raiffa (1976) prove that a multidimensional utility function can be formulated as a weighted sum of one-dimensional utility functions. Our proposed approach here does not make any such assumptions, thus weakening the dominance requirements. Moreover, our approach appears algorithmically and computationally more tractable as seen from the computational results in Section 5. Note that although we use the same P in defining the objective function and constraints in Model I, it would be possible to use different sets for objective and constraints if desired.
Model reformulations and algorithmic analysis
In this section we study solution methods for Models I and I . Throughout we will assume that P is given by its extreme points. This allows us to produce more practical bounds in our analysis when the given number of extreme points is small. The situations where P is given by linear equality and inequality constraints is more general. The analysis in is applicable for such situations, and it can be adapted for the models in this article.
Model I reformulation
We first present a reformulation of Model I that is used for later algorithmic development and analysis. From (Müller and Stoyan (2002) Theorem 1.5.7) constraints (2b) are equivalent to
Hence, the following model is equivalent to Model I.
Note that Equation (5) has uncountably many expected value constraints. This presents some difficulties in developing algorithms for computing statistical lower and upper bounds and establishing global convergence properties. Building upon our previous work we present an algorithm and convergence results later in this section for such problems. Our analysis uses several assumptions, which are discussed below. In order to successfully generate an upper bound in our method we need to assume that the feasible set of Equation (5) 
In the following we develop an algorithm for Equation (6) under the following additional assumptions:
Assumption 1: X is a compact set and there exists a constant 
Later in Section 5 we will see that in our budget allocation problem the constants of D, K, and L in Assumptions 1 to 3 are known. Assumption 1 implies that |w
, we can restrict z to the interval [−K, K] hence, the feasible region of Equation (6) is compact.
SAA
We now study the convergence properties of the SAA of Model (6). The SAA method approximates the expected value function with an average of Monte Carlo samples to formulate an approximation of the original problem. The analysis presented here follows similar steps to the one in . However, here the results are presented under the assumption that P is given by a set of vertices instead of a set of linear inequalities. We now discuss the SAA approximation of Equation (6). Let 
The sample average approximation of Equation (6) is written as
Convergence
We now study the asymptotic convergence of the feasible region of Model (10) with increasing sample size. Let us consider the probability of an event
The following theorem presents a large deviation type result for our problem. This theorem shows that as the sample size N increases, the sample average approximation set S 0 N is contained in and it contains perturbations of the original feasible set (i.e., S − and S ) with a probability that converges to one exponentially fast. The result is very similar to Theorem 3.2 in but there are some important differences due to the different assumptions made; for example, the inequalities in Theorem 1 hold for any > 0, whereas the corresponding results in are valid only for sufficiently small . A proof is presented in Appendix A1.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumptions A1 to A3 hold. Given
In particular, given (10), over a subset of the feasible region S 0 N . We build a heuristic method in Step 2. Let V be a finite subset of P. At a solution of (ẑ,x), we denote
Cut-generation algorithm
Algorithm 1 Cut-Generation Algorithm 0. Let l = 0 and choose arbitrary finite sets
or if Equation (12) is infeasible, exit.
l is unchanged, go to Step 3; otherwise, go to Step 1.
For
solve the problems (13), let w ik and ψ ik be a optimal solution and objective function value; if Dentcheva and Ruszczyński (2003) ). Therefore, if
. If the heuristic method generates some new cuts, this algorithm returns back to Step 1; otherwise, it goes on with the next step. In
Step 3, we consider the separation problems (i = 1, . . . , N and k = 1, . . . , q) for the solution (ẑ,x)
If all subproblems (13) have a non-negative objective function value, the algorithm stops with an optimal solution of Model (10). Otherwise, we have a solutionŵ of Model (13), for some i and k, with a negative value. Using this solution we generate a valid cut
. Theorem 2 shows that this algorithm will stop after a finite number of iterations. The theorem follows directly from the results in Homem-de-Mello and Mehrotra (2009), but we include it here for completeness and give the proof in Appendix A2. Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 terminates after a finite number of steps with either an optimal solution to Model (10) or a proof of infeasibility of Model (10).
Algorithm 1 needs to solve N subproblems (13), which are polyhedral Difference of Convex Functions (DC) programming problems minimizing a difference of two convex polyhedral functions over a polyhedral set. Homemde-Mello and Mehrotra (2009) also present an integer programming formulation of problem (13). We use this reformulation (see problem (19a)) in our computation.
Statistical bounds
Since solving a large-scale stochastic program to optimality is expensive and often not necessary, it is useful to have techniques for computing statistical lower and upper bounds for such problems. For optimization problems with stochastic dominance constraints developed such techniques in a general setting. Below we adapt their ideas for computing statistical lower and upper bounds for the P-dominance constrained Model (6).
Statistical lower bound.
Using an initial sample group with a small sample size N 0 , Algorithm 1 stops with a master program with a finite subset of {1, . . . , q} × [−K, K] × P generated in Steps 2 and 3. Let W N 0 denote that subset. Letν(k, η, w) ((k, η, w) ∈ W N 0 ) be the optimal dual solutions for the dominance constraints in
M l groups of samples of size N l each. Using these samples, we define
and g k (·) with the j th sample group. Equation (14) excludes z since the sum of all µ d is equal to one by the KKT condition. Following we now compute a statistical lower bound for Equation (6) in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Denotē
Then,
is a 100(1 − α)% confidence lower bound for the optimal value of Equation (6).
Statistical upper bound.
We now present a method for generating an upper bound for Model (6). The method extends the method in . Note that constraints
− z ≤ 0 have no contribution to the feasible regions of Model I and its SAA problem. Hence, only considering the P-dominance constraints, we can first use the line search algorithm in with an initial sample size N 0 to obtain a solution x N 0 that is feasible to Equation (6) with probability 100(1 − α 1 )% for a given α 1 ∈ (0, 1). We state that algorithm in Appendix A3 for completeness. Next, we construct statistical upper bound for max d∈{1, ..., a} f d (x) at x N 0 , which is also a probabilistic upper bound for (6). With N u independent samples, we denote
Using the method in Mak et al. (1999) , we obtain:
which is a 100(1 − α 2 )% confidence upper bound for f d (x N 0 ) for α 2 ∈ (0, 1). Thus, we have a statistical upper bound for Equation (6) in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.
is a 100(1 − α 1 )(1 − α 2 )% confidence upper bound for the optimal value of Equation (6). Given a desired significance level 100(1 − α 1 )% for the upper bound, we can choose α 1 and α 2 such that 1 − α = (1 − α 1 )(1 − α 2 ). Note that the effort required to obtain a probabilistic feasible solution is much greater than the effort to compute the approximation of the objective function value. Since higher confidence levels yield wider confidence intervals-which in turn require the use of larger sample sizes to keep the interval width under a desired tolerance-we recommend choosing 1 − α 2 close to one in order to keep 1 − α 1 as low as possible (although of course 1 − α 1 > 1 − α).
Homeland security budget allocation case study
Budget allocation problems are fundamentally multiobjective problems where multiple views have to be reconciled to achieve organizational goals. In this section we present an application of our proposed modeling techniques in the context of budgeting for homeland security, an area that has become centrally important since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As catastrophes are unpredictable and lead to unwanted consequences, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has endeavored to use risk management to help guide the spending on prevention, response, and recovery from such national catastrophes (see Caudle (2005) ; Wright et al. (2006); Reifel (2006) ). DHS funds national urban areas through the UASI. The total budget under this initiative for 2009 was $799 000 000. This budget was allocated to 62 urban areas with 60% of the money allocated to the 10 highest risk urban areas. The problem of risk-adjusted budget allocation is central to terrorism and security risk reduction under the UASI (H.M. Brody, Federal Emergency Measurement Agency, personal communication, 2010). The Federal Emergency Management Agency collects information on area risks (Metropolitan Statistical Areas and States/Territories) to evaluate their individual risk profiles. This risk assessment information together with project proposals are used to make urban area funding decisions. Unfortunately, currently these decisions are ad hoc and lead to dissatisfaction among those affected by the allocated budgets (Dahl, New York Police Department, personal communication, 2010 ).
An approach to the budget allocation problems that mitigates the impact of disasters within the limited resources is desirable. Ideally, appropriate budget allocation should be made to achieve best possible risk reduction. The process of target risk estimation (for example, see Azaiez and Bier (2007) for a reliability-based approach) is beyond the scope of this article. For our purposes we take the target risk estimators as given but assume that there is some imprecision in the values. Note that, since vulnerable targets have different types of loss profiles such as population density (resulting in greater fatalities) versus infrastructure value (resulting in greater monetary losses), it is difficult to equate such criteria with a consensus weight vector.
Decision methodologies such as scenario analysis (see Willis and Kleinmuntz (2007) ), reliability and failure analysis (see Azaiez and Bier (2007) ), game theory (see Powell (2007) and Zhuang and Bier (2007) ), and cost-benefit analysis (see Farrow and Stuart (2009) ) have been proposed for homeland security budget allocation (see also Parnell et al. (2006) ). Willis et al. (2005) presented an optimization model to minimize the expected potential error resulting from underestimating funding share for the urban areas under UASI. Bier et al. (2008) proposed a game theoretic approach for allocation strategy among the ten highest risk urban areas. All of these proposed techniques do not take into account the multi-objective nature of the problem and assume that the risk parameters are estimated accurately.
We now give a prototype model for UASI budget allocation. Recall that in our context we will take A to be a (m × n) stochastic matrix such that A i j ≥ 0, n j =1 A i j = 1. The (i, j ) entry of the matrix A represents, for each criterion i , the proportion of losses for urban area j relative to the total losses for all urban areas. The randomness of A reflects the fact that the losses cannot be predicted exactly. The matrix A is called the risk share matrix. In the RAND Corporation report, Willis et al. (2005) construct a budget misallocation function as
Under the j th criterion the goal is to allocate budget to the j th target according to risk share A i j . Allocations under the risk share are penalized but are not penalized if they are over the risk share.
Similar to Willis et al. (2005) , our budget misallocation function is constructed by the cost overrun risk:
Note that we are not squaring the budget overrun function. This allows us to generate linear subproblems. Using the function M(·) defined in Equation (15), we solve two versions of the homeland security budgeting problema robust unconstrained model (Model I ) and a stochastic dominance-constrained version (Model I) that uses the government and RAND allocations as benchmarks.
Homeland security budgeting model analysis
We now study the characteristics of the budget misallocation function M(.). The special form of Equation (15) allows us to get practical values of algorithmic parameters for our case here. Since budget allocation problems can be formulated in terms of percentages, we can take the feasibility set X as {x ∈ R n + : x 1 ≤ 1}; hence, Assumption 1: holds with D = 1. We also have the following proposition (see Appendix A4 for proof), showing that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold with K = 1 an L = n.
Proposition 3. The budget misallocation function (15) has the following properties:
1. For all w ∈ P (where P is the set defined in Equation (1)) and x ∈ R min z; subject to (16a)
Here, w ilk (l = 1, . . . , b ik ) are the w-components of the vertex solutions of P ik in Equation (A7), which are finite in number; i.e., b ik is finite. We solve problem (11) in Algorithm 1 by its linear reformulation given in Equation (16). Recall that we need the optimal dual solutions in the construction of the statistical lower bound. Let us now consider the relationship between the optimal dual solutions of Equations (10) and (16). Denote vectors µ, ν, and τ as the non-negative multipliers of constraints (16b) to (16g). µ and ν respectively correspond to constraints (16b) and (16c) and τ is for other constraints. Thus, we construct the Lagrangian function of Equation (16) on the feasible region X as:
Also, define the Lagrangian of Equation (10) as:
The following theorem links the Lagrangian functions φ(·) and ψ(·). A proof is given in Appendix A5.
If (ẑ,x,t,r ) is an optimal solution of linear program (16) and (μ,ν,τ) is the corresponding optimal dual solution, then (ẑ,x,t,r,μ,ν,τ) is a saddle point of φ(·). Theorem 3 shows that (μ,ν) is an optimal dual solution of Equation (10).
We solve the separation subproblems (13) in Algorithm 1 by an equivalent binary mixed integer program (see Homem-de-Mello and Mehrotra (2009)): . . . , N, (19e) where
. . , N} has finite number of vertex solutions. The coefficients α j , β j together with the binary variable b j are introduced in (19) to ensure that only one of the variables g j and h j is positive at a feasible solution of (19). Note that Algorithm 1 requires solving 2q N 2 linear programs in each iteration to obtain all α j and β j . As the sample size increases, this procedure is costly. Using Proposition 3, we have N, j = 1, . . . , N and k = 1, . . . , q. Thus, it suffices to let α j and β j be one for all j in Equation (19) . Although this relaxation may result in an increase of computation time to solve each mixed-integer problem, it brings net savings by avoiding all calculations of all α j and β j values. 
Data generation for the model
We now describe the data we use in the computational testing of our model. The raw data were obtained from Willis et al. (2005) and Bier et al. (2008) . They involve four risk indicators: (i) property losses; (ii) fatalities; (iii) air departures; and (iv) average daily bridge traffic. The air departures and daily bridge traffic are considered critical infrastructure. Although Willis et al. (2005) also provide data for injuries, we do not include them here since the data for fatalities and injuries are strongly correlated. The results presented here are for the ten major urban areas of the United States (see Table 1 ). The same ten areas were used in Bier et al. (2008) . These areas received 40% of the total UASI budget in 2004 and 60% of the total UASI budget in 2009. The number of air departures in these urban areas is roughly a third of the total departures in the nation (see Bier et al. (2008) ).
Construction of the risk share matrix
Using the Risk Management Solutions (RMS) Terrorism Risk Model, Willis et al. (2005) produce three perspectives on terrorist threats: a standard, reduced, and enhanced threat outlook. The details of the RMS model are not available. However, it is suggested that this model considers foreign terrorist organizations and domestic threat groups and different beliefs about the terrorist motivations and capabilities. The data from the RMS terrorism risk model are given in Table 1 under columns "standard," "reduced," and "increased" risk. Using the property losses, fatalities, air departures, and average daily bridge traffic data, the risk share matrix A is estimated as follows. Denote a random risk index matrix as R for which element R i j is the risk value for j th city under the i th risk metric. We regard property losses R 1 j and fatalities R 2 j as random variables with equally likely outcomes; i.e., a probability of one-third is assigned to each scenario. The air departures are denoted by R 3 j and the average daily bridge traffic by R 4 j . In practice, these are random quantities as they change from one day to the next. We consider the numbers in Table 1 as the expected value of air departures and bridge traffic. In our computation we assume that they are random variables with log-uniform distributions. The log-uniform distribution has been used in Willis et al. (2005) to simulate uncertain parameters. We describe R i j (for i = 3 and 4) as follows:
where U is a random variable uniformly distributed on [−1, 1], γ > 1 and t i j are some constants. By taking the expectation of R i j , t i j can be expressed as
The parameter γ controls the volatilities of the random air departure and bridge traffic. The random R i j are converted to risk shares A i j as
Construction of benchmarks
We use two benchmarks in Model I for the DHS UASI budget allocation problem. The first benchmark is based on previous DHS UASI budget allocations. The second benchmark is based on the allocation suggested in the RAND report by Willis et al. (2005) . The goal here is to find a budget allocation that stochastically dominates the budget allocations from the government and the RAND report. These benchmark budget allocations were constructed as follows. Table 2 shows the annual percentage of the budget allocations of the UASI funding in the latest five fiscal years. Their average gives the government benchmark. We choose the allocation recommendation from Willis et al. (2005) according to the property loss criterion. For the ten areas this allocation was computed using the property loss data in Table 1 , and the budgets were allocated using optimal solution of min{
. . , n.} as suggested by Willis et al. (2005) . Allocations to some urban areas in these two benchmarks differ significantly. The biggest difference is for New York, which 
Construction of weight region
We now describe the approach we use in our numerical tests for constructing the weight region P. Let the number of vertices of P be equal to the number of criteria m. represents an initial choice of the importance of each criterion and our choice for P allows for perturbations of c while keeping the norm equal to one. In the case of the homeland security problem, there are four criteria; hence, m = 4. In our tests, we use three centers: (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4) equally treating each criterion, (1/8, 1/8, 3/8, 3/8) emphasizing the air departures and bridge traffic, and (3/8, 3/8, 1/8, 1/8) giving more consideration to the property losses and fatalities. To simplify the statement, the first center is called Equality-Center, the second is called Infrastructure-Center, and the last is called Property-Fatality-Center. A larger θ means a larger weight region. For Model I this results in a solution that is best for the worst possible weight from a larger uncertainty set. For Model I the use of a larger weight region requires finding a solution that is preferable to the benchmarks for risk-averse decision makers.
Numerical performance of the stochastic dominance budget allocation model
In this section, we discuss the numerical performance of Models I and I. (10) has a good convergence behavior on these problems. We finally study a batch sampling method, which is a good way to reduce the variance of the optimal value and solution of Equation (10).
Computing time
We ran Model I with sample sizes 100, 200, and 300, respectively, locating the center at Equality-Center and choosing the variability parameter γ and the weight region size parameter θ as (γ, θ) = (3, 0.15). The corresponding computing times are 0.534, 2.262, and 5.758 seconds, suggesting that Model I is easy to solve for a reasonable sample size. Model I is solved by Algorithm 1. Table 3 records the number of iterations, generated cuts in Steps 2 and 3, and nodes used by CPLEX 12 to solve all mixed-integer linear programs (19)-reformulation of subproblems (13)-and computing time in seconds. The column Total time gives the total time used by Algorithm 1 and column Time of
Step 3 gives the running time for Step 3, which entails solving Equation (19).
In the test, we set W 0 (the set of generated cuts) to be empty and V 0 (the set used in the heuristic method of Step 2) to include all the vertices of weight region P. The time required to perform Steps 1 and 2 of Model I is less than a minute, even for the largest sample size. However, the total computational time of Model I is significantly greater and it grows quickly with the sample size. In particular, these times are dominated by the time required to solve the mixed integer programs in Step 3. We also observe that while solving the cut-generation sub-problem, the number of nodes required by CPLEX 12 increases with the sample size. Interestingly, however, in our test problems all added cuts are generated using the vertices of P, which are known to us ahead of time. The availability of these cuts can be explored without solving the separation problems (14) is less than or equal to zero. This explains why Step 3 is so time consuming-the mixedinteger problem (19) must be solved to optimality to ensure that no w ∈ P yields a strictly negative objective function value in Equation (14). The observation that CPLEX 12 uses 92% of the total time to solve the mixed-integer programs Equation (19) suggests the importance of developing efficient methods for generating cuts from (13) and quickly verifying when no such cuts are available. Such an investigation is currently in progress.
Statistical lower and upper bounds
Let us now discuss the results in Table 4 for obtaining the statistical lower and upper bounds for Model I, which we described in Section 3.1. The sampling parameters for building the lower and upper bounds are given as N 0 = 50, N l = 1000, M l = 20, and N u = 500 000. We use the Equality-Center for the test results discussed in this section. All of the gaps between the lower and upper bounds are very small. The biggest difference is only 0.0084 when comparing 99% bounds for the case that (γ, θ) is equal to (3, 0.25) . This case also provides the maximum relative difference 2.51% relative to the value of the lower bound. The small gaps show that the SAA problem (10) has a good convergence behavior for Model I. Note that the method does not calculate bounds in some cases, which appear to be either infeasible or have very small feasible regions. These are shown by "'-" in the table. We also give the times in seconds for computing the 95% confident lower and upper bounds. The computing times for these lower bounds are relatively stable. The computing times for these upper bounds seem to increase with the variability (γ ) and the size of the weight region (θ).
Let x N be the x-component of the optimal solution of Equation (10) when (γ, θ) = (3, 0.15). We estimate A) ], the objective function value of Model I at x N , with independent samples of large size 500 000. Table 5 lists the estimated objective values for five independent sample groups with sample size N. When N is 25 or 50, two of the five values are out of the range between lower and upper bounds in Table 4 , which suggests that in these cases the optimal solution is not achieved. Moreover, the estimated objective values show some fluctuation. When N is up to 75 or 100, the five values become stable and all fall in the range between the bounds, indicating that the true optimal solution has likely been found. 
Batch sampling for optimal solution estimators
We now discuss the use of the Batch Sampling Method (BSM) to obtain more accurate estimators of optimal solutions. Solving Equation (10) for M independent sample groups with size N each, we obtain the respective optimal solutions (z
as the optimal solution of Equation (10). Note thatz N is also an estimator of the optimal value. Birge (2009) uses numerical tests to show that BSM can give better results with a smaller sample size; i.e., M batches of N samples each give better solutions than a single batch of MN samples.
We choose M = 20 and N = 100 in the test. In the case (γ, θ) = (3, 0.25), compared to the sample means (budget allocation values in the range [2.42-49 .27%]), the sample variances are very small (≤ 10 −4 ). More specifically, the ratios of sample standard deviation over the sample mean are (1.39, 3.70, 3.70, 5.92, 4.26, 2.73, 7.82, 7.12, 12.39, and 7.20%) . This result suggests two conclusions: (i) the optimal solution of Equation (10) appears to be unique; and (ii) it is possible and reasonable to analyze model Equation (6) by the batch means of the optimal values and solutions of (10) for reducing the variance.
Discussion on budget allocations
We now study the budget allocations recommended by Models I and I. Recall that Model I is the same as Model I but it has no constraints. The behaviors of these models are analyzed at different settings of the parameters: the center location, the size of weight region, the variability of air departures and bridge traffic, and the conditional probability relating property losses and fatalities. Recall that the center determines the levels of importance for property losses, fatalities, air departures, and bridge traffic; θ means the size of weight region P; γ contributes to the variability of the uncertain air departures and bridge traffic; and π affects the correlation between property losses and fatalities. We let π = 1/2 in the following analyses, except for the results in the sensitive analysis for π in Appendix B.
A base case
Let us first discuss the case with the Equality-Center and (γ, θ) = (3, 0.25). We call this our base case. Figure 1(a) gives the optimal values and solutions of Models I and I. We also give the government and RAND benchmarks in columns (i) and (ii). When choosing the two benchmarks as the solutions, the corresponding objective values are 0.3454 and 0.3921, respectively. In comparison, Model I has the lowest objective function value 0.3163 and Model I has an objective function value between Model I and the benchmarks. Letx be the optimal solution of Model I. By the definition of P-dominance and convexity of M,
, which verifies that the optimal objective function value of Model I is below those values given by the benchmarks.
The optimal allocation of Model I is close to the government benchmark. Indicated by column (iii) of Fig. 1(a) and Table 6 , the maximum difference is 6.77% in Los AngelesLong Beach and the average difference is 2.43%. Note that Table 6 . Outputs of Model I over the largest weight region Risk-adjusted budget allocation models *The absolute variation of Model I measures the difference between the optimal solution of Model I and the government benchmark. The relative variation is the ratio of the absolute variation over the government benchmark. **The absolute variation of Model I measures the difference between the optimal solution of Model I and the RAND benchmark. The relative variation is the ratio of the absolute variation over the RAND benchmark.
the absolute and relative variations of Model I in Table  6 measure the difference between the optimal solution of Model I and the government benchmark and those of Model I depend on the RAND benchmark. The maximum difference between Model I and the RAND benchmark is 25.55% for New York and the average difference is 5.51%.
The maximum difference between the recommendation of Model I and the RAND benchmark is 9.35% for New York and 2.79% on average. This implies that constraints (2) with the government benchmark are much weaker than those with the RAND benchmark, which pulls the final decision away from the solution of Model I toward the RAND benchmark. This suggests that Model I does not give sufficient attention to the risk control that the decision makers require in the RAND benchmark.
Moreover, Table 6 gives the relative variations of Models I and I with respect to the government and RAND benchmarks, respectively. The two largest relative differences happen in Boston, MA-NH (88.55%), and Seattle-Bellevue-Everett (85.46%) for Model I . The two areas together are allocated 6.98% of the total budget by the government benchmark. For Model I, they are Newark, NJ (485.52%), and Seattle-Bellevue-Everett (259.81%). They are only allocated 1.33% of the total budget by the RAND benchmark.
Role of the center
We now compare the results of Models I and I for different centers. Figure 1(b) gives the optimal values and solutions of the models at the Infrastructure-Center and Fig.  1(c) shows those at the Property-Fatality-Center. We have mentioned that the Equality-Center equally treats the four criteria, the Infrastructure-Center emphasizes protecting the infrastructure, and the Property-Fatality-Center gives more emphasis to property losses and fatalities.
At the Infrastructure-Center, Model I still gives an optimal solution closer to the government benchmark. The maximum difference is 6.75% in Los Angeles-Long Beach and the average difference is 2.36%. However, Model I supports the RAND benchmark at the PropertyFatality-Center. Compared to the RAND benchmark, the maximum difference is 4.52% in New York and the average difference is 1.78%. These results suggest that the government benchmark is somehow inclined to defending the infrastructure against terrorist attacks. As we mentioned, the RAND benchmark is constructed with property losses. Model I obviously agrees with the RAND benchmark when the Property-Fatality-Center is used to underline the importance of property losses and fatalities. When we are seeking a robust solution over a sufficiently large P, Model I is insensitive to the centers. Let us further consider some cases in which we fix P ≡ {w ∈ R m + : w 1 = 1}; i.e., the cases provide robust optimal solutions over the largest possible weight region. To illustrate the robustness with respect to the weight region, Table 6 gives the optimal solutions of Model I for different values of the variability factor γ and the maximum and average differences between the optimal solutions and the government benchmark. The results are rather stable at about 6.45% for the biggest differences and 2.52% for the average.
The Infrastructure-Center reduces the impact of property losses and fatalities by giving more emphasis on air departures and bridge traffic. As a result, the dominance constraints lose their impact, and consequently Model I yields the same solution as Model I (see Fig. 1(b) ). A small weight for property loss directly relaxes the dominance constraints from the RAND benchmark. Also, the dominance constraints function weakly at the Property-Fatality-Center (see Fig. 1(c) ). The optimal allocation of Model I is a little closer to the RAND benchmark than that of Model I ; however, the maximum difference of the allocations given by Models I and I is only 1.11% in New York. Since Model I for the Property-Fatality-Center has highlighted property losses and fatalities, the RAND benchmark obtained from property losses does provide much additional contribution. On the other hand, it is for the same reason that the emphasis on property losses and fatalities weakens the dominance constraints from the government benchmark.
It is important to note that the functions of the objective and the dominance constraints are partially overlapped in their purpose in Model I. Both of them work to control the budget misallocation.
Conclusions
This article has proposed a modeling approach for multicriteria budget allocation problems under uncertainty, using recently developed concepts of multi-objective robust optimization and multivariate linear second-order stochastic dominance constraints. We have applied our modeling approach to real data to determine a budget allocation to the ten main urban areas in the United States. This approach produces solutions that dominate the benchmarks from a risk-averse perspective. We have also analyzed the sensitivity of the results with respect to the input parameters. The results demonstrate the applicability and validity of the proposed models. Using our model(s), we obtained allocations that are less risky than the benchmarks, which indicates that the proposed models can be very effective. We also performed limited sensitivity analysis by correlating property losses with fatalities to understand the impact of this correlation on the model solution. No significant changes were observed in the budget allocations with various degree of correlations (see Appendix B).
The numerical tests have also shown the need for an efficient and fast algorithm to solve the large-scale sample average approximation of the stochastic dominance model. The bottleneck of the algorithm used in this article is the mixed-integer program that must be solved every iteration. The numbers presented in the article correspond to the solution times obtained with a general mixed-integer program solver; conceivably, the computational times can be greatly reduced by implementing strategies that exploit the structure of the subproblems. Research on that topic is underway. and the same proof also applies to f d N (.). 3. Fixing η and w, we have
for all x, x ∈ X . Analogously, it follows that:
Thus, the first inequality holds by
Using the same argument, we can prove that the second inequality also holds.
We now prove Theorem 1. Note that:
We only need to calculate the probability of {S Therefore, it follows that:
Thus, considering the probability of {S 0 N S } together, we finally have:
Also, the second part follows by imposing 2(a + q)
A2: Proof of Theorem 2
Let
for i = 1, . . . , N and k = 1, . . . , q. It follows from Theorem 1 in Homem-de-Mello and Mehrotra (2009) that all w ik generated in Step 3 are the w-components of vertex solutions of P ik .
A4: Proof of Proposition 3
1. Recall that A is a stochastic matrix and w 1 = 1 for all w ∈ P. It follows that: 
A5: Proof of Theorem 3
For convenience in the proof, let Y be the feasible region described by constraints (16d)-(16i). Also denote constants Clearly, (ẑ,x,t,r) is an optimal solution of Equation (16) and hence (ẑ,x) is an optimal solution of Equation (10).
Thus, it is easy to see that
By Equation (A8), for d = 1, . . . , a, we have that:
The last equality holds since (ẑ,x,t,r,μ,ν,τ) is a saddle point for φ(·). Analogously, for i = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . , q, and l = 1, . . . , b ik , it follows by Equations (A8) and (A9) that
Let us now prove that (ẑ,x) is a minimizer of ψ(z, x,μ,ν) over [0, 1] × X . Note that it follows from KKT that φ z (ẑ,x,t,r ,μ,ν,τ) = 0. Then, we have μ 1 = 1. In the same way Equation (16) that introduces the immediate variables r i jlk and t jsk , the problem min{ψ(z, x,μ,ν) :
Recall that vector τ is the multiplier for constraints (16d) to (16g). Let τ consist of four components, τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 , and τ 4 , which respectively respond to constraints (16d) to (16g).
Furthermore, Equation (A12) can be equivalently written as
since ϒ(x,t,r ) is zero for (ẑ,x,t,r ,μ,ν,τ) is a saddle point. Now compare Equation (A13) with Equation (17). If we replace ϒ(x,t,r ) with ϒ(x, t, r ), the objective function of Equation (A13) changes to φ (z, x, t, r,μ,ν,τ) . We use the properties of a saddle point again. The new problem over the region Y obviously provides an optimal value, φ (ẑ,x,t,r ,μ,ν,τ) , no more than the optimal value of Equation (A13). For all (z, x) ∈ R × X, it follows that ψ(z, x,μ,ν) ≥ φ (ẑ,x,t,r ,μ,ν,τ) = ψ(ẑ,x,μ,ν) .
Note that the last equality is from the same substitution for x as above by Equations (A8) and (A9). Finally, by Equations (A10), (A11), (A14) and the fact that (ẑ,x) is feasible to Equation (10), our conclusion directly follows from Theorem 6.2.5 in Bazaraa et al. (2006) .
Appendix B: Sensitivity analyses of parameters
B1: Budget allocated to New York in the Models
New York is the most important region in all of the urban area budgets. While New York has the largest discrepancy between the government benchmark and the RAND benchmark, it is indisputably given most of the budget by all policies. The average recommendation from Models I and I gives New York 41% of the total budget in Fig. 1(a) , 33% of the total budget in Fig. 1(b) , and 55% of the total budget in Fig. 1(c) . Chicago, the second important area in our cases, gets about 14%. Moveover, we realize that, for different models and cases, the recommendations for New York show a large fluctuation. In Fig. 1(a) , the difference is 16%. We compare the average results in the two cases for the Equality-Center and Infrastructure-Center. This value at New York decrease from 41% to 33%. In comparison, the allocations are rather stable at the other nine cities. The differences are at most 3% for all the policies in Fig. 1(a) . Also, the biggest difference between those cases at the two centers is only 2%. The above observation indicates that we can use the difference at New York as a measure to compare results among the models and cases. Thus, the following discussion focuses on the model behavior for New York. Let the proportion of the total budget given to New York be called NY-Budget for short.
B2: The role of the weight region size
We now discuss the impact of different values of the weight region parameter θ on the allocations suggested by Models I and I. It is clear that the effect of dominance constraints is magnified by increasing θ. Testing the two cases for different γ s, Fig. A1 labels NY-Budgets of the models at the Equality-Center and Infrastructure-Center as θ increases. Note that the RAND benchmark and the government benchmark are two constants, 58.61 and 31.93% in Fig. A1 .
Given a small θ, Model I has different NY-Budgets for the two centers; however, the NY-Budgets become closer as θ increases and are identical at large values of θ. Actually, both of them are gradually approaching the robust optimal solutions over the largest weight region in Table 7 . Recall that Model I optimizes the worst case with respect to the weight region. Thus, as the size of the weight region increases, the center becomes unimportant. Dominance constraints are unbinding for the initial small weight regions so that Models I and I have the same NY-Budgets when θ is 0.1. As θ increases, these constraints compel the NY-Budgets of Model I to deviate from those of Model I and go toward the dominating benchmarks. In the two figures, Model I for the Equality-Center is feasible only if P is a small region. We have mentioned the conflict of the two benchmarks in Section 4.2; i.e., the corresponding allocations are very different. Because of this conflict, Model I becomes infeasible as θ grows. It follows that the constraints from the government benchmark prevent the solution of Model I from significantly departing from the government benchmark.
B3: Role of the parameter uncertainty
We now discuss the NY-Budgets of Models I and I for different values of the variability parameter γ in Fig. A2 . The NY-Budgets of Model I show monotonic behaviors for the Equality-Center in Fig. A2(a) and for the InfrastructureCenter in Fig. A2(b) . For the other two cases, the values fluctuate in the beginning; however, NY-Budgets still monotonically increases or decreases when γ is large. The air departure and bridge traffic have higher volatilities as γ increases. For the Equality-Center, it is a good policy that Model I emphasizes the relatively stable criteria-property losses and fatalities-when deciding how to allocate the resource. The NY-Budgets correspondingly goes up. On the contrary, the NY-Budgets decreases in these cases for the Infrastructure-Center, where we are required to highlight the air departure and bridge traffic even if they are highly uncertain. As a result, we have to give these two criteria more consideration to weaken the impact of their uncertainty.
Model I for the Equality-Center shows a monotonically increasing NY-Budget toward the dominating benchmark, the RAND benchmark, along with γ . The observation also applies to Model I for the Infrastructure-Center. When the dominance constraints are not binding in the beginning, Models I and I overlap NY-Budgets. However, as γ increases, some dominance constraints become binding and NY-Budgets exhibits a monotonic behavior. The rule verifies that the dominance constraints from the RAND benchmark are emphasized as γ increases and, on the other hand, those from the government benchmark become weaker. The same reason also applies to the feasibility of Model I. For the case with θ = 3, Model I for the Equality-Center is feasible only for a large enough γ , which relaxes the dominance constraints from government benchmark. On the contrary, Model I for the Infrastructure-Center loses its feasibility as γ increases, since in that case it becomes difficult to satisfy the dominance constraints from the RAND benchmark.
B4: Sensitivity analysis with property loss and fatality risk correlation
Since property losses and fatalities are often correlated, here we summarize our experience of their correlation on proposed budgets. We assume that risk values of property losses and fatalities are correlated with each other, but both are independent of air departures and bridge traffic. Since we do not have data on the correlation for each urban area, we adopt the following approach. Let s, t be one of the three scenarios: "standard," "reduced," and "increased" risks. Denote p st as the conditional probability of fatality in scenario t given the property loss in scenario s. Let the conditional probability be π := p ss ∈ [1/3, 1] and p st = (1 − π)/2 for s = t. For π = 1/3 the property losses and fatalities are independent and if π = 1 they are fully correlated. Note that we first fix π = 1/2 in our computation and then discuss its impact on the optimal solutions of Models I and I by a sensitivity analysis. For (γ, θ) = (3, 0.25) and different values of π in the above range we found no significant difference in allocated budgets. 
Biographies
